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• Nikolaj Jang Pedersen　　“Considerations on Neo-Fregean Ontology”,　in: R. Bluhm and C. Nimtz ed., Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.5, Bielefeld 22.–26.09.2003

In this paper I will do three things. First, I shall reconstruct Hale and Wright's solution to the Caesar Problem, which involves stating their characterization of the notion of a category. Second, I shall provide an alternative characterization of the notion of a category, which will make the structure of neo-Fregean ontology more clear　− or at least this is the hope. Third, I will argue that the Caesar Problem can be solved in a framework more minimal than that of Hale and Wright, viz. one in which categories are dispensed with.

• C. S. Jenkins　　“Knowledge of Arithmetic”,　in: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 56, no. 4, 2005

The goal of the research programme I describe in this article is a realist epistemology for arithmetic which respects arithmetic’s special epistemic status (the status usually described as a prioricity) yet accommodates naturalistic concerns by remaining fundamentally empiricist. I argue that the central claims which would allow us to develop such an epistemology are (i) that arithmetical truths are known through an examination of our arithmetical concepts; (ii) that (at least our basic) arithmetical concepts are accurate mental representations of elements of the arithmetical structure of the independent world; (iii) that (ii) obtains in virtue of the normal functioning of our sensory apparatus. The first of these claims protects arithmetic’s special epistemic status relative, for example, to the laws of physics, the second preserves the independence of arithmetical truth, and the third ensures that we remain empiricists.

• Peter Milne　　“Tarski on Truth and Its Definition”,　in: Childers, Kolar and Svoboda ed., Logica'96. Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium, Filosofia, Prague, 1997

As Anil Gupta observes, ‘there is much misunderstanding about Tarski’s work on truth’. Here I want to examine four questions over which there has been considerable misunderstanding:
(1) What is the semantic conception of truth?
(2) What is the significance of translation in the criterion of material adequacy?
(3) What is the status of T-sentences?
(4) What role does the definition of truth by satisfaction play in Tarski’s thinking about truth?
…

• ditto　　　“Notes on Teaching Logic”,　in: Discourse: Learning and Teaching in Philosophical and Religious Studies, 4/1, 2004