- David J. Chalmers “Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account”
Frege’s views on these questions [of propositions and propositional attitudes] are no longer as popular as they once were. But I am inclined to think that they are correct, at least in broad outline if not in every detail. In particular, I think it is plausible that sentences express entities that are quite closely akin to Fregean thoughts. And I think it is plausible that attitude ascriptions ascribe relations between subjects and these entities. In what follows I will defend these claims.
- Agustin Rayo “Plurals”, November 1, 2006, forthcoming in: Philosophical Compass.
English contains singular terms, quantifiers and predicates (e.g. ‘it’, ‘something’ and ‘. . . is an elephant’). But it also contains plural terms, quantifiers and predicates (e.g. ‘they’, ‘some things’ and ‘. . . are scattered on the floor’). Philosophers have become increasingly interested in plurals over the past couple of decades. The purpose of this paper is to explain why plurals might be thought to have philosophical importance, and why they have led to philosophical debate.