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• Benjamin Callard　　“The Conceivability of Platonism”,　in: Philosophia Mathematica, third series, vol. 15, no. 3, 2007

It is widely believed that platonists face a formidable problem: that of providing an intelligible account of mathematical knowledge. The problem is that we seem unable, if the platonist is right, to have the causal relationships with the objects of mathematics without which knowledge of these objects seems unintelligible. The standard platonist response to this challenge is either to deny that knowledge without causation is unintelligible, or to make room for causal interactions by softening the platonism at issue. In this essay I argue that the idea of causal relations with fully platonist objects is unproblematic.

• Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock　　“Why and How Platonism?”,　in: Logic Journal of IGPL, vol. 15, no. 5-6, 2007

Probably the best arguments for Platonism are those directed against its rival philosophies of mathematics. Frege's arguments against formalism, Gödel's arguments against constructivism and those against the so-called syntactic view of mathematics, and an argument of Hodges against Putnam are expounded, as well as some arguments of the author. A more general criticism of Quine's views follows. The paper ends with some thoughts on mathematics as a sort of Platonism of structures, as conceived by Husserl and essentially endorsed by the author.

そして次の本の末尾の数ページを確保。

• Bertrand Russell　　Our Knowledge of External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy, George Allen & Unwin, 1922. First published in 1914 by The Open Court Pub.

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