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以下の本がまだ新刊で手に入るようなので注文する。

• J. Alberto Coffa　　The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station, Cambridge University Press, 1993

This major publication is a history of the semantic tradition in philosophy from the early nineteenth century through its incarnation in the work of the Vienna Circle, the group of logical positivists that emerged in the years 1925–1935 in Vienna who were characterised by a strong commitment to empiricism, a high regard for science, and a conviction that modern logic is the primary tool of analytic philosophy. In the first part of the book, Alberto Coffa traces the roots of logical positivism in a semantic tradition that arose in opposition to Kant's theory that a priori knowledge is based on pure intuition and the constitutive powers of the mind. In Part II, Coffa chronicles the development of this tradition by members and associates of the Vienna Circle. Much of Coffa's analysis draws on the unpublished notes and correspondence of many philosophers. The book, however, is not merely a history of the semantic tradition from Kant ‘to the Vienna Station’. Coffa also critically reassesses the role of semantic notions in understanding the ground of a priori knowledge and its relation to empirical knowledge and questions the turn the tradition has taken since Vienna.

Contents
Part I. The Semantic Tradition:
1. Kant, analysis, and pure intuition;
2. Bolzano and the birth of semantics;
3. Geometry, pure intuition and the a priori;
4. Frege's semantics and the a priori in arithmetic;
5. Meaning and ontology;
6. On denoting;
7. Logic in transition;
8. A logico-philosophical treatise;
Part II Vienna, 1925–1935:
9. Schlick before Vienna;
10. Philosophers on relativity;
11. Carnap before Vienna;
12. Scientific idealism and semantic idealism;
13. Return of Ludwig Wittgenstein;
14. A priori knowledge and the constitution of meaning;
15. The road to syntax;
16. Syntax and truth;
17. Semantic conventionalism and the factuality of meaning;
18. The problem of induction: theories;
19. The problems of experience: protocols;

PS
二日前の日記でLevineさんのabstract

• James Levine　　“Analysis and Abstraction Principles in Frege and Russell”

を引き、次のように記した。

Levineさんのものでは、Frege and Russellそれぞれのanalysisに対する理解の違いがabstraction principleの理解の違いを生み、そのことが両者のlogicismに対する理解・立場の違いを生んでいるというお話。最近abatraction pirncipleの一事例となっているHume's Principleを調べていることから、このLevineさんの話は興味引かれる。FregeとRussellがabstraction principleに対し、大きく異なる理解を示しているというのは面白い。

今日はRussellがabstraction principleについて、実際どのように言っているのかを読み、理解することに努め、memoを作る。
このmemoに基づき、FregeとRussellのabstraction principleに対する見解の相違を、またこの日記に後日書きとめることができればと思う。

おやすみなさい。