最近入手した文献の名を掲げます。英語文献を挙げ、次に日本語の文献を挙げます。

  • Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam ed.  Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 1983
  • Frank Plumpton Ramsey  Philosophical Papers, D. H. Mellor ed., Cambridge University Press, 1990
  • Dirk van Dalen  “Herman Weyl's Intuitionistic Mathematics,” in: The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, vol. 1, no. 2, 1995
  • John P. Burgess and A. P. Hazen  “Predicative Logic and Formal Arithmetic,” in: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 39, no. 1, 1998
  • Solomon Feferman  “The Significance of Hermann Weyl's Das Kontinuum,” in V. F. Hendricks, et al. ed., Proof Theory: History and Philosophical Significance , Kluwer Academic Publishers, Synthese library, vol. 292, 2000
  • Stewart Shapiro  “We Hold These Truths to Be Self-Evident: But What Do We Mean by That?,” in: The Review of Symbolic Logic, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009

At the beginning of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (§2) [1884], Frege observes that “it is in the nature of mathematics to prefer proof, where proof is possible”. This, of course, is true, but thinkers differ on why it is that mathematicians prefer proof. And what of propositions for which no proof is possible? What of axioms? This talk explores various notions of self-evidence, and the role they play in various foundational systems, notably those of Frege and Zermelo. I argue that both programs are undermined at a crucial point, namely when self-evidence is supported by holistic and even pragmatic considerations.