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Fregeの研究書を1つ注文する。その他に以下を入手。

• John Perry　　“Frege on Identity, Cognitive Value, and Subject Matter”,　2003

Intro.

No paragraph has been more important for the philosophy of language in the twentieth century than the first paragraph of Frege’s 1892 essay “Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.” He begins,

Sameness [Gleichheit] gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects?

Frege continues by explaining what bothered him in the Begriffsschrift, and motivated his treatment of identity in that work. He goes on to criticize that account. By the end of the paragraph, he has introduced his key concept of sinn, abandonning not only the Begriffsschrift account of identity, but its basical semantical framework.

• ditto　　　“Evading the Slingshot”,　in: Philosophy and Cognitive Science, A. Clark, et al. (ed.), The Netherlands, 1996

Intro.

The topic of this essay is “the slingshot,” a short argument that purports to show that sentences designate (stand for, refer to) truth values. Versions of this argument have been used by Frege, Church, Quine and Davidson; thus it is historically important, even if it immediately strikes one as fishy. The argument turns on two principles, which I call substitution and redistribution. In “Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations,” Jon Barwise and I rejected both principles, as part of our attempt to dismantle the slingshot and defend the view that sentences stand for complexes of objects and properties rather than truth values. In his book An Essay on Facts, Ken Olson maintains that our treatment turns on the structuralist conception of facts, and that this conception leads either to a block universe of co-implicating facts, or bare particulars. I’ll first review the case against the slingshot, and then consider the issues Olson raises.