- Kathrin Koslicki “Isolation and Non-Arbitrary Division: Frege’s Two Criteria for Counting”, in: Synthese, vol.112, no.3, 1997
Abstract In §54 of the Grundlagen, Frege advances an interesting proposal on how to distinguish among different sorts of concepts, only some of which he thinks can be associated with number. This paper is devoted to an analysis of the two criteria he offers, isolation and non-arbitrary division. Both criteria say something about the way in which a concept divides its extension; but they emphasize different aspects. Isolation ensures that a concept divides its extension into discrete units. I offer two construals of this: isolation as discreteness, i.e. absence of overlap, between the objects to be counted; and isolation as the drawing of conceptual boundaries. Non-arbitrary division concerns the internal structure of the units we count: it makes sure that we cannot go on dividing them arbitrarily and still find more units of the kind. Non-arbitrary division focuses not only on how long something can be divided into parts of the same kind; it also speaks to the way in which these divisions are made, arbitrarily or non-arbitrarily, as well as to the compositional structure of the objects divided.
昨日紹介させていただいたKoslickiさんのpaperを早速copyして入手。Fregeのsortalsに関して。分析的形而上学からの考察という感じで面白そうだ。
- Joan Weiner “What's in a Numeral? Frege's Answer”, in: Mind, vol. 116, no. 463, 2007
Frege wanted to define the number 1 and the concept of number. What is required of a satisfactory definition? A truly arbitrary definition will not do: to stipulate that the number one is Julius Caesar is to change the subject. One might expect Frege to define the number 1 by giving a description that picks out the object that the numeral ‘1' already names; to define the concept of number by giving a description that picks out precisely those objects that are numbers. Yet Frege appears to do no such thing. Indeed, when he defends his definitions, he does not argue that they pick out objects that we have been talking about all along—the issue never comes up. The aim of this paper is to explain why. I argue that, on Frege's view, our numerals do not, antecedent to his work, name particular objects. This raises an obvious question: If (like ‘Odysseus') the numerals do not name particular objects, how can Frege write (as he does) as if sentences in which numerals appear state truths? One central concern of this paper is exegetical—to answer these questions. But my aim is not solely exegetical. For these questions direct us to something that, I believe, creates only an apparent problem for Frege but an actual problem for many contemporary philosophers: the assumption that singular terms appearing in statements about the world must actually have referents. Another aim of this paper is to suggest that the problem—as well as a solution that can be found in Frege's writings—should be of import to contemporary philosophers.
こちらもcopy。Mind最新号。
- Wayne M. Martin “Fichte’s Legacy in Logic: Thetic Judgment from the Wissenschaftslehre to Brentano”, forthcoming in Fichte-Studien
It is not usual to think of Fichte as a logician, nor indeed to think of him as leaving a legacy that shaped the subsequent history of symbolic logic. But I argue here that there is such a legacy, and that Fichte formulated an agenda in formal logic that his students (and their students in turn) used to spark a logical revolution. That revolution arguably reached its culmination in the logical writings of Franz Brentano, better known as a founding figure of the phenomenological movement. In logical writings that were published only posthumously, but that were fully elaborated in the decade prior to the publication of Frege’s Begriffschrift, Brentano (together with his collaborator Anton Marty) developed a radically innovative logical calculus that was explicitly designed to overthrow the orthodox logical analysis of judgment and inference. At the center of this revolution was the notion of thetic judgment [thetische Urteil], a form of judgment upon which Fichte had insisted in the first published version of the Wissenschaftslehre, and which his students subsequently set out to accommodate within the framework provided by Kant’s general logic. But thetic judgment proved resistant to such assimilation, and it was left to Brentano to use the analysis of thetic judgment in his attempt to topple a long-standing logical tradition.
In what follows I reconstruct the main episodes in this century-long drama in the logical theory of judgment. My discussion is divided into four sections. I begin with a review of Fichte’s most explicit call for logical revolution, together with his introduction of the notion of thetic judgment, set against the backdrop of an anomaly within Kant’s logical commitments. In the second section I trace the logical treatment of this anomaly among Fichte’s philosophical progeny, in particular Johann Friedrich Herbart and Moritz Drobisch. The third section explores Brentano’s position, and his more radical solution to the anomaly bequeathed by Kant. In the final section I return to Fichte, to consider to what degree these subsequent developments remained faithful to the logical agenda Fichte had projected.
こちらは上記でリンク追加と記したMartinさんの論文原稿。しかしFichteとlogic!? Intro.を読むと一応わかりました。まぁ判断論というところだろうか。“Brentano's Reform of Logic”(by Peter Simons)をFichteは用意したという訳なのだろうか。ちなみにSimonsさんの論文はまだ読んでいません。Copyしてたかな？
- Lloyd Humberstone “The Connectives”, Draft manuscript, incomplete.
1000ページ以上もある本の原稿。もちろんすぐには読まれない…。
- Leon Horsten “Philosophy of Mathematics”, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, September 25, 2007
- Bruce Hunter “Clarence Irving Lewis”, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, September 25, 2007
四〜一四世紀のギリシア・ラテン・アラビア科学を統一的視野で捉え、近代科学の素性を解明。科学史の忘れられた一千年の空隙を埋める名著。〈解説〉金子務
要するに、中世科学史の概説書。1978年刊行の再刊。とても便利に使えそうな1冊。序章で中世科学史を勉強する際の基本文献が、研究史を回顧する形で上げられており、しかもこの文庫版再刊の時点での文献名追加もいくらかなされていて有益。とりあえずこの序章だけでもまずは読んでおくつもり。
- ルドルフ・カルナップ 『論理的構文論：哲学する方法』、吉田謙二訳、晃洋書房、2007年
新刊。大学書籍部にあるのを見つける。このような本が出るとは知らなかった。まったくノー・マーク。驚いた。これはとても面白そうだ。
この本は次の翻訳のようである。
- Rudolf Carnap Philosophy and Logical Syntax, Kegan Paul, 1935
内容は三つの講演からなる。「形而上学の排除」、「言語の論理的構文論」、「哲学の方法としての構文論」。
100ページにも満たない小冊子で、小型のhard cover。コンパクトで持ち運びに便利だ。しかも講演であるから気楽に読めそうである。
お値段もお手ごろの1,200円ほど。Carnapはもちろんのこと、Logical EmpiricismやQuineについて知りたい人は一読すべき1冊かもしれない。
しかし訳者の吉田先生はRussellをご専門とされているのだから、未邦訳のRussell文献、特に初期の哲学文献を訳していただければと個人的には思っております。ぜひともお願い申し上げます。と、勝手にお願いしてもご迷惑になるだろうが…。
