- 土屋俊 「フレ―ゲにおける固有名の意味について −『意味とさされるものについて』論文冒頭箇所の解釈をめぐって−」、『哲学雑誌』、94巻、766号、1979年
この論文は土屋先生のHPから入手可能。
- Richard Cartwright “On the Logical Problem of the Trinity”, in his Philosophical Essays, The MIT Press, 1987
これもnetから入手可能。このCartwrightさんの論文については、例えば次のcomment*1。
One of the novel claims in Geach's Reference and Generality was that identity is relative in the strong sense that b and c might be the same F, but not the same G.
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One of the examples he gives is that b might be the same river as c, but not the same water. If some bronze is made into first one statue, then a different one, then the two statues are not the same statue but are the same bronze.
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Almost all of Geach's examples can with some plausibility be treated by distinguishing more carefully between objects of reference or distinguishing constitution from identity.
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The one example that does not readily lend itself to these approaches is the problem of the Christian Trinity. According to this doctrine, God the father, Jesus and the Holy Spirit are three persons but one God or one substance. Thus they provide an alleged example where b and c are distinct persons but the same substance. We will not enter the debate, which is been conducted for over a millennium, as to whether this doctrine is coherent, but refer the reader to a modern discussion in Cartwright 1987[“On the Logical Problem of the Trinity”].
- Nino Cocchiarella “Denoting Concepts, Reference, and the Logic of Names, Classes as Many, Groups and Plurals”, in Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 2, 2005
Bertrand Russell introduced several novel ideas in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics [PoM] that he later gave up and never went back to in his subsequent work. Two of these are the related notions of denoting concepts and classes as many. Russell explicitly rejected denoting concepts in his 1905 paper, "On Denoting". Although his reasons for doing so are still a matter of some debate, they depend in part on his assumption that all concepts, including denoting concepts, are objects and can be denoted as such.1 Classes of any kind were later eliminated as part of Russell’s "no-classes" doctrine, according to which all mention of classes was to be contextually analyzed in terms of reference to either propositions, as in Russell’s 1905 substitution theory, or propositional functions as in Principia Mathematica [PM]. The problem with classes, as Russell and Whitehead described it in [PM], is that
"if there is such an object as a class, it must be in some sense one object. Yet it is only of classes that many can be predicated. Hence, if we admit classes as objects, we must suppose that the same object can be both one and many, which seems impossible" (p. 72).
Both notions are worthy of reconsideration, however, even if only in a somewhat di¤erent, alternative form in a conceptualist framework that Russell did not himself adopt. In such a framework, which we will brie‡y describe here, Russell’s assumption that all concepts are objects will be rejected in favor of a conceptualist counterpart to Frege’s notion of unsaturatedness, and we will reconsider the idea of a class as many somehow being both one and many.
―他我問題、知覚、言語と時間―
哲学ってのはこうやるもんなんだ！だが、私は、大森荘蔵という1人の哲学者が、その全身で自らの思索を刻んでいく姿を描き出したかった。大森ブランドの哲学製品をショーウインドウに並べ、解説したり値踏みしたりするのではなく、それを作り、壊し、未完成のまま低く呻き声をあげている、その生身の身体を、読者の前に差し出したい。乱暴に言い切ってしまえば、そうして、「哲学ってのはこうやるもんなんだ！」と見得を切りたいのである。 ―＜本書より＞
今日はCafeで
- Crispin Wright Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects, Aberdeen University Press, Scots Philosophical Monographs Series, no. 2, 1983
を少し読む。また読もう。
