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入手文献 入手文献
  • B. Hale and C. Wright　　“Responses to Commentators”, Book Symposium on The Reason's Proper Study, Philosophical Books, vol. 44, no. 3

W. Demopoulos, G. Rosen, I. Rumfittの三人の批判に答える。

  • Juliette Kennedy　　“Two Moments in the Philosophical Life of Kuert Goedel”,　July 6, 2007, Preprint

Introduction
We examine two sets of Godel's writings, from the very beginning of his philosophical life, and from the end of it, to wit: some remarks from the introduction to his 1929 thesis, written when Godel was 22 years of age; we will also take up some remarks Godel made about the Euthyphro, one of the so-called “Socratic” dialogues of Plato, in the course of a discussion with the　proof theorist Sue Toledo in 1975, who took notes of that conversation.
The intention in choosing these particular moments from Godel's philosophical life is to construct something of a philosophical portrait of Godel, rather than draw any particular connections between them　−though the connections are undoubtedly there, and are undoubtedly strong ones.

  • N. Pedersen　　“Entitlement in Mathematics”, in: MATHNET 12, Newsletter of the Danish Network for the History and Philosophy of Mathematics

Crispin Wright has recently introduced a non-evidential notion of warrant – entitlement of cognitive project – as a promising response to certain sceptical arguments, which have been subject to extensive discussion within mainstream epistemology. The central idea is that, for a given class of cognitive projects, there are certain basic propositions – entitlements – which one is warranted in trusting provided there is no sufficient reason to think them false. (SeeWrigh [2].) The aim of this paper is to provide an account of the notion of entitlement of cognitive project and briefly discuss the question whether there is any work for the notion of entitlement to do within the philosophy of mathematics. Bearing in mind its applications in mainstream epistemology, it will be suggested that the notion can be used to formulate a response to certain kinds of scepticism which call into question the warrantability of (acceptances of) propositions that appear integral to mathematical theorizing in a given mathematical theory T – in particular, that T is consistent and that T’s background logic is sound.