• History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 29, no. 2, 2008


  • Enrico Moriconi and Laura Tesconi  “On Inversion Principles”
  • Rafal Urbaniak  “Leśniewski and Russell's Paradox: Some Problems”
  • Theodore Hailperin  “Probability Logic and Borel's Denumerable Probability”
  • Dale Jacquette  “Object Theory Logic and Mathematics: Two Essays by Ernst Mally”
  • J. W. Dauben  “Essay Review: W. Tait, The Provenance of Pure Reason: Essays in the Philosophy of Mathematics and Its History


Sobocinski in his paper on Leśniewski's solution to Russell's paradox (1949b) argued that Leśniewski has succeeded in explaining it away. The general strategy of this alleged explanation is presented. The key element of this attempt is the distinction between the collective (mereological) and the distributive (set-theoretic) understanding of the set. The mereological part of the solution, although correct, is likely to fall short of providing foundations of mathematics. I argue that the remaining part of the solution which suggests a specific reading of the distributive interpretation is unacceptable. It follows from it that every individual is an element of every individual. Finally, another Leśniewskian-style approach which uses so-called higher-order epsilon connectives is used and its weakness is indicated.